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Abstract 
Sovereign external assets (SEAs) comprise foreign exchange reserves and sovereign wealth 
funds (SWFs). The global stock of reserves reached 7 $trn in the second quarter of 2008, 
but data on SWF are rather elusive. Our estimation puts the SWFs at around 2.5 $trn. dollars 
by 2007 and in the last years they have grown at a high pace, fostered by high commodity 
prices. Therefore, SEAs have surpassed the 10 $trn mark (around 5% of global assets 
and 15% of global GDP). This paper argues that reserves and SWF assets should be jointly 
considered for the assessment of global imbalances. Both are official capital outflows  from 
developing to developed countries, both hinder internal adjustment in current account 
surplus countries, both help to cover the financing needs of deficit countries, in particular in 
the US, and, therefore, both contribute to sustain global imbalances. 
The importance of SEAs in financing the external imbalances of the US has been 
widely recognised but scantly measured. Our rule-of-thumb calculations suggests that they 
have greatly increased their importance in the last years, having surpassed the trillion dollars 
increase in 2007; relative to US financing needs, this amount represents around a 135% 
and 50% of net and gross needs, respectively, in 2007. Reserves have in the last years 
contributed 80% and SWFs 20%. Looking ahead, two main conclusions can be put forward: 
1) the relative importance SWFs in the financing of the US deficits and global imbalances is 
set to increase (also relative to reserves), but this is conditional to commodity prices 
remaining at high levels. On the one hand, the economic motivation of SWFs ⎯intertemporal 
smoothing⎯ is more palatable than that of reserves (exchange rate management), despite 
political concerns on SWFs; on the other hand, SWFs do not have significant internal costs, 
contrary to reserves, whose monetary and fiscal costs are increasing in the margin; 2) SEAs 
can well buttress US financial needs in the years ahead, providing resilience to the global 
imbalances. Dramatic shifts in the pace of SEAs accumulation ⎯due for instance to an 
adjustment of commodity prices⎯ or in the investment allocation would jeopardise these 
prospects. 
 
JEL classification: E58, F21, F36, G15. 
Keywords: International reserves, sovereign wealth funds, global imbalances, exchange 
rates.  
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1 Introduction 
External imbalances have been widening since the beginning of the decade although they have 
started to moderate last year. The sum of current account surpluses worldwide has surpassed 
2% of global GDP, compared to 0.7% in 2001, as seen in graph 1, top)1. More interestingly, the 
group of emerging market countries (EMEs) have become since then net creditors to the 
advanced economies: the current accounts of EMEs with surpluses add up to close to 1.5% of 
global GDP, similar to the sum of developed countries external deficits. 
 
 
 
                                                                          
1. The figures for deficit evolve similarly but there are divergences due to error and omissions and conversions to a common 
currency. 
                                                                           GRAPH 1: GLOBAL IMBALANCES
Source: IFS (IMF)
Gulf Countries: Kuwait, Saudi Arabia, UAE, Oman, Qatar
(*) An increase in REER means an appreciation.
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China (10% of c/a surplus over GDP in 2007, see graph 1, bottom) and oil exporters 
(Gulf countries surplus surpassed 25% of their domestic GDP) account for 1% c/a surpluses in 
terms of world GDP; on the deficit side US stands out (5% of its GDP or 1.3% of world GDP). 
The US has endured a substantial exchange rate adjustment since 2002 which should contribute 
in the medium run to moderate the external deficit, see graph 1, bottom, although the evolution of 
oil prices has dampened the adjustment. On the contrary, exchange rate developments in surplus 
countries have been less favorable for the adjustment: the real exchange rate of China ⎯which 
still holds a soft peg to the dollar⎯ and the oil countries ⎯many of them dollar pegs have only 
recently started to appreciate in the last years, and mostly due to inflation differentials. 
Economic theory would suggest that capital tends to flow from developed to developing 
countries, where the expected return on capital is supposed to be larger. Therefore, the financing 
of developing countries to developed economies can be considered an anomaly, or, as famously 
labeled by Nobel prize Robert Lucas (1990) a paradox. At that time, the uncertainty on growth 
prospects in developing countries, the risks perceived and the reduced global financial 
liberalization could justify the pattern of flows [Alfaro et al. (2008)]. But in the last decade growth 
prospects have materialized in the developing world, volatility has been lower, and great leaps in 
global financial integration have been implemented, so that capital inflows to developing countries 
should increase. Indeed, as observed in graph 2 gross private capital inflows to emerging 
economies have multiplied by eight during this decade, from less than 200 $bn in the late nineties 
to more than 1600 $bn in 2007. 
How is it then possible to conciliate both facts: their net creditor position against 
developed countries and the accruing of ever larger capital inflows? Just by the huge growth of 
capital outflows that emerging economies are engineering through two main mechanisms: foreign 
exchange reserves accumulation and sovereign wealth funds (SWF). But note that this implies the 
bulk of EMEs financing to advanced economies is done by public (sovereign) institutions. 
We denote this category of capital as sovereign external assets (SEAs). More precisely 
we define SEAs as the sum of reserves and sovereign wealth funds assets invested abroad2. 
Since they are central to the economic policy of the main EMEs contributors to the global 
imbalances (China/reserves, Gulf countries/SWFs) they potentially play a central role in their 
determination. 
There has been a large body of literature focusing on the contribution of reserve 
accumulation in EMEs to covering US financial needs, mainly through its role as preventing 
nominal exchange rate adjustments [see for instance Dooley, Folkerts-Landau and Garber (2008) 
and references therein]. In contrast, there is hardly any study focusing on SWF in this context, 
maybe because this financial category has come to the fore of policy discussions only recently. 
Therefore, our main contribution in this paper is the attention paid to SWF and the 
comparison to with reserve accumulation. We argue that they play a similar role explaining global 
imbalances. As a matter of fact we state that ⎯assuming that commodity prices remain at high 
levels⎯ SWF may play an increasing contribution to the maintenance of global imbalances, also 
relatively to reserve accumulation since the perceived costs ⎯economic or reputational⎯ 
attached to them are low. 
 
                                                                          
2. There are other public or semi-public capital flows, such as those arising from public firms investing abroad which could 
enter this category. Although relevant in recent times, they are dismissed from the analysis. 
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The paper is organized as follows. First, we present quantifications on the transfers 
received by SWFs in the last years, and obtain the evolution of their assets under management in 
the last years. In section 3, we define the concept of sovereign external assets from the 
decomposition of the balance of payments accounts. Then, in section 4 we compare reserves 
and SWFs in terms of evolution, motivation, costs, and their economic implications. Finally, we 
pave the way to assess their importance in sustaining global imbalances, now and in the future. 
 
-200
0
200
400
600
800
1,000
1,200
1,400
1,600
1,800
average
97-99
2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007
bn US$
Africa Central and eastern Europe
Commonwealth of Independent States Emerging Asia
Middle East Western Hemisphere
China Serie8
GRAPH 2: PRIVATE FINANCIAL INFLOWS, 1997-2007
Source: WEO (IMF).
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2 Estimation of assets and transfers of Sovereign Wealth Funds 
The analysis of SWFs is heavily conditioned by data limitations on transfers to SWFs, assets 
under management, and their evolution over time. There are some estimations on the current size 
of SWFs [Setser and Ziemba (2007 and 2008); Truman (2007); JP Morgan (2008)]. However, to 
the extent we are aware, there is not a systematic estimation of their evolution over time, and no 
estimation assures consistency in the methodology across time or countries. 
Therefore, our aim is to provide an estimation of a globally consistent time series of SWF 
assets. We combine a direct approach, namely a quantification of transfers and assets of a given 
SWF when they are know, and an indirect approach that tracks these variables from the impact 
of SWFs on other statistics (such as balance of payment, fiscal accounts, or central bank’s 
balance sheets), and ensure the consistency of both. When a country has several SWFs ⎯v.g. 
Singapore⎯, we estimate their total assets, and the assets of each of the SWFs, when available, 
serves just as cross-check. 
The countries under study can be divided, according to data availability and institutional 
framework, in three groups, as shown in table 1: standard SWF with ample disclosure, standard 
SWF with no disclosure, and SWF embedded in central banks’ balance sheets. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
The first group of countries provides disclosure on its size and transfers received by their 
respective SWFs. This information allows to compute the evolution of the SWF in a rather 
straightforward way from their balances and some additional information. For the rest of 
countries, the computations get more complex, since the degree of transparency is much lower. 
The estimation of assets and transfers for SWFs with no disclosure is more challenging; however, 
it is possible to obtain estimations on their size and evolution using data on fiscal accounts, 
balance of payments, and additional reports. 
The third category refers to countries ⎯v.g. Saudi Arabia or Russia⎯ which manage 
their SWFs through the central bank balance sheets. For this group of countries it is necessary to 
disentangle “pure international reserves” (those net of the external assets of SWF included in the 
central bank balance sheet), from those international reserves which are backed by central 
government deposits, that is, which at the end of the day are the external assets of SWF. To do 
so, we build on central bank balance sheet data, in which there is usually an account with 
deposits from central government. The resulting figures are then cross-checked with balance of 
Table 1: Classification of SWF according to data availability
Disclosure No disclosure
Singapore China Russia
Venezuela Kazahstan Algeria
Norway Korea Hong-Kong
Chile Kuwait Saudi Arabia
Malaysia
Oman
Qatar
UAE
SWF embedded in central bankStandard SWF
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payments, fiscal data and other evidence. Two final considerations relevant for the analysis are 
valuation effects and the share of assets invested abroad. Valuation effects can be relevant for 
those SWF which have more aggressive investment strategies (such as, for instance, the SWF of 
Norway, Singapore, Kuwait or UAE) and for all of them due to exchange rate movements 
because they determine the level and evolution of the assets. However, it is awkward to do even 
a rough approximation to them. On the contrary, we have disentangled, when possible, external 
from internal assets of SWF, since we wish to focus in the former3. The data are quite patchy, but 
the difference is particularly important in Singapore and Malaysia, and to a lesser extent in Russia 
and Norway. Table 2 presents the evolution of SWFs on a country-basis, and the estimated share 
of external assets in their portfolios ⎯which is extremely high for the aggregate (93% in 2007)⎯. 
 
Table 2: Total Assets Under Management by SWF (bn US$)
1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007
Total assets (1)+(2) 86 123 150 484 797 1,023 1,364 1,793 2,547
Of which: total external assets 86 123 150 484 765 972 1,302 1,738 2,375
Total oil & energy SWF (1) 28 48 74 408 600 795 1,088 1,475 1,960
Argelia 4 6 6 8 14 29 46 49
Chile 1 9 19
Kazahstan 2 4 5 8 14 20
Kuwait n.a. n.a. n.a. 94 115 140 160 200 250
Norway 28 43 69 85 148 192 238 306 384
Russia 19 44 82 181
Saudi Arabia n.a. n.a. n.a. 21 37 60 126 197 271
Venezuela 8 19 33
Oman n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. 1 3 5 8
Qatar n.a. n.a. n.a. 1 2 10 20 35 56
UAE n.a. n.a. n.a. 200 286 354 452 571 708
Total, other (2) 59 75 76 75 197 229 276 318 587
China 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 200
Hong Kong 59 75 76 75 74 78 77 88 98
Malaysia 0 0 0 0 0 13 15 18 26
Korea 0 0 0 0 0 0 20 20 20
Singapore n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. 123 137 163 182 223
Source: Owns estimation from national statistics, SWFs reports and IFS (IMF).  
                                                                          
3. It is important to note that the information for GCC is incomplete. We are able to compute transfers of external assets from 
2003 onwards, but do not have information neither on the fraction of external versus internal assets before 2003, nor to 
compute transfers of internal assets from 2003 onwards. 
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3 Sovereign External Assets (SEAs) and its components 
3.1 A balance of payments definition 
The nature Sovereign External assets can be well explained, taking into account the balance of 
payments identity. Net capital inflows into a country have their counterpart in a current account 
deficit [that is, a negative c/a balance (CA Balance)] and/or an increase in reserves (∆Reserves).  
For our convenience, we can write then 
CA Balance + Net capital inflows = ∆Reserves 
Net capital flows is the result of subtracting gross capital outflows from gross capital 
inflows. Both have a private and a public component: public capital outflows in developing 
countries can be assimilated to the increase sovereign wealth funds assets (see section 2 for an 
exposition of how we have obtained such flows) invested abroad. Rearranging the previous 
expression along this decomposition, we can rewrite the balance of payments identity as 
CA Balance + K inflows – Private K outflows = ∆SWF assets + ∆Reserves = ∆Sovereign external assets 
The right-hand term of the equation, the sum of the increase in SWFs assets and 
reserve accumulation constitute the increase in sovereign external assets (SEAs) of a country. 
Note that large current account surpluses and strong capital inflows can be offset by the 
accumulation of reserves and sovereign wealth funds; that is, the growth in sovereign external 
assets can explain the puzzle outlined in the introduction. 
 
 
 
Latin-america SWF: Chile, Venezuela
Gulf Countries: Kuwait, Saudi Arabia, UAE, Oman, Qatar
Other commodity exporters: Algeria, Kazakhstan
Asia SWF: Hong-Kong, Singapore, Malaysia , Korea 
GRAPH 3: SOVEREINGN EXTERNAL ASSETS AND BALANCE OF PAYMENT, 2006
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This is precisely what can be observed in graph 3 where the two sides of the identity are 
compared for a selected group of developing countries4. The explicit consideration of SWFs 
estimated investments gives a preliminary indication of their importance relative to reserves in 
some countries, in particular for several Latin American countries, Gulf economies and other 
commodity exporters5. 
3.2 The features of SWFs and reserves, compared 
The common categorization of reserves and sovereign wealth funds as sovereign external assets 
suggests that they have common features ⎯in particular, in explaining global imbalances, but 
they also display important differences in terms of evolution, motivation or management. Table 3 
compares both. 
One common feature is their dramatic growth in the last years, although the stock of 
reserves was already large at the beginning of this decade (see graph 4, upper left). The stock of 
the international reserves was around 6 trillion dollars in 2007, twice the level in 2003, and they 
reached 7 $trn by 2008Q2. In spite of this large accumulation the rate of growth has even 
increased in the last two years. 
Our estimates of sovereign wealth funds in the previous section put their number at  
around 2.5 $trn dollars in 2007 ⎯2.4 in external assets⎯ from less than 500 $bn in 2002, see 
graph 4 upper right. The big leap in SWFs assets ⎯a 30% annual rate of growth in the period 
2003-2007⎯ has been determined by the increase in commodity and in particular oil prices, 
since 2003. Graph 4, lower left displays the strong correlation between SWF asset accumulation 
and oil prices in the Gulf countries in the last years. 
All in all, the magnitude of sovereign assets in the order of 8.7 $trn in 2007 from around 
4 $trn in 2004. The 2007 figure amounts to the close to 15% of global GDP the 35% of global 
government securities, 17% of equities and, overall, around 5% of global financial assets. 
Reserves represent two thirds of this magnitude (11.2% of world GDP) and the SWFs the 
remaining third (4.5% of world GDP). Growth in SWFs has implied that their share in sovereign 
assets has substantially: in 2003 they represented around 20% of sovereign assets, by now they 
are around 30%. 
                                                                          
4. The difference between the bars is due to errors and omissions. 
5. The case of China in the figure merits a comment. As shown in the graphs the net private capital inflows were close to nil. 
This is striking because it is known that capital inflows to China are huge (close to 200 $bn in 2006). Therefore private capital 
outflows must match that quantity. These private capital outflows took the form of foreign investment abroad (semi-public 
firms) or holding of foreign assets by domestic banks. This last items is related to monetary policy implementation and, in 
particular, to avoid, appreciating exchange rate pressures. 
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A second common trait is that both international reserves and sovereign wealth funds 
are very much concentrated in developing economies (see graph 4). 
The bulk of reserve accumulation (graph 4, upper left) has taken place in 
Asia ⎯including Japan until 2004), which accounts for more than half of world reserves. China, 
which holds over 1.5 trillion of international reserves (a 30% of the total), dominates the picture. 
Other emerging regions, such as Latin America have accumulated large holdings of reserves 
⎯reaching 12.7 of GDP in the region as a whole, although their share in the global holdings is 
much smaller (6.5% of total reserves). 
Sovereign wealth funds are concentrated in commodity ⎯in particular oil⎯ exporters 
(See graph 4, upper right, and table 4). Most of them are emerging countries, Gulf countries and 
Russia stand out by their magnitude, but some developed countries, such as Norway ⎯which 
has a large fund⎯ Australia or even Alaska in the US have created SWFs. Some South Asian 
countries with large fiscal resources have also established SWFs. 
In the last years there has been an incipient trend towards the constitution of new SWFs, 
with a particular development standing out for its relevance in our context: the constitution of 
SWF whose capital accrues from accumulated reserves, like in the case of China which last year 
committed a 200 $bn of reserves to a new SWFs (around 100 $bn are now allocated). 
              GRAPH 4: RESERVES AND SWF
Source: IFS (IMF)
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The evolution and geographical location of sovereign external assets is explained by the 
motivation for reserve accumulation and SWFs, which is to a large extent different. 
 
Two main reasons for reserve accumulation in the central banks have been identified by 
the literature: the precautionary motive and exchange rate management. Huge reserve 
accumulation can be explained by the interest of emerging economies to build a buffer against 
financial instability after their financial crisis in emerging crises in the last decade. Graph 4, (lower 
right) the evolution of international reserves versus that of short term external debt. According to 
the Guidotti-Greenspan rule, foreign reserves should cover short-term (up to one year) external 
debt. This rough measure suggests that the bulk of reserve accumulation could not be explained 
just by the precautionary motive. Some formal analysis on this issue confirm this impression 
[Edison (2003); García and Soto (2004); Gosselin and Parent (2005)], although other more recent 
work suggests that ⎯with the remarkable exception of China⎯ reserve accumulation might be 
justified by fundamentals [Jeanne and Rancière (2006); Obstfeld et al. (2008); Ruiz-Arranz and 
Zavadjil (2008)]. 
In any case, it is hard to deny that the exchange rate management motive is nowadays a 
significant driver of reserve accumulation. The policy objectives of this strategy can be diverse: to 
foster competitiveness; to avoid exchange rate overshooting induced by short-term volatile 
capital inflows or transitory shocks; or to avoid negative sectoral impacts on some exposed 
sectors (Dutch disease), a reason closely connected to positive commodity shocks, etc. [see 
Alberola and Serena (2007) for a more detailed discussion]. 
The rationale for the constitution of SWF is intertemporal and/or intergenerational 
smoothing. The intensity of commodity price cycle and its large impact of exporters advise for the 
accumulation of resources in the good times to keep for the bad times. Furthermore, the 
non-renewable nature of some commodity resources, such as oil, calls for the investment of a 
part of the accrued resources for the benefit of future generations, in the form of financial 
SWF-from 
international 
reserves
1,950 $bn commodity
300 $bn non-commodity
[+70 $bn of internal assets]
Precautionary Smoothing of the impact of Reducing costs of
commodity prices (or excess of 
fiscal resources)   over the
hoarding reserves
Objective By-product of management of 
exchange rates
 commodity/fiscal cycle, or keep 
resources for future generations
Long-run. Long-run.
Conservative. Conservative.
Low risk aversion. Low risk aversion.
Investment Liquidity
Diversification:
(sectors and countries with
low correlation with commodities).
Balance sheet
Fixed income. Equity Equity
Assets  Fixed income
Private equity Fixed income
Deposits
Cash
Capital Debt with the
Liabilities Sterilization central bank.
bonds
Source: owns elaboration.
Size 6.000 $bn 100 $bn (aprox.)
[+100 $bn of internal assets]
Table 3: Size, objectives and investment structure of Sovereign External Assets
Central banks-International 
reserves
SWF
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investments abroad, or of real investment at home (predominantly directed to diversify the 
economic structure of the countries). 
The diverse motivation of reserve accumulation and SWFs highlight a fundamental 
difference among these SEAs. Both are the result of a policy decision. However, SWFs can be 
understood as a natural consequence ⎯out of prudence⎯ of the economic structure 
of a country to smooth the impact of commodity shocks. Accumulation of reserves is a 
discretionary policy geared ⎯beyond the precautionary motive⎯ to maintain the exchange at a 
desired level and a comfortable external position. 
Thus, it can be argued that SWFs are the result of a policy action to smooth extreme 
economic impact ⎯and drastic adjustments⎯ derived from large exogenous shocks, while 
reserve accumulation is rather directed to maintain a favourable competitiveness position. 
In other words, although both limit automatic external adjustment, the case for SWFs is stronger 
and more justifiable in economic terms than the case for reserve accumulation. 
The motivation for each SEA also explains the difference in their investment strategies. In 
general, reserve accumulations are held in fixed income, most of it public (US Treasuries are the 
main component in reserves, in particular in those countries pegged or with strong links to the 
dollar), since the priority is liquidity. Therefore, the returns on the reserves tend to be low. On the 
contrary, investments by SWFs tend to be less conservative ⎯although far from highly risky⎯ 
and directed to the long run. Sometimes investments are directed to foreign firms, so that the 
proportion of equity ⎯and private equity⎯ tends to be relevant. 
Another relevant difference is the counterpart of the sovereign assets in the balance 
sheets of the holding institutions. International reserves are central bank assets and their 
“automatic” counterpart of the increase is an increase in the monetary supply (a liability of 
the central bank), unless this expansion is avoided by sterilization operations. In this case the 
liabilities to the banking system (in form of bonds or deposits) become then the counterpart of the 
increase in reserves. In stark contrast, the counterpart to SWF assets is their own capital, as 
SWFs are rarely leveraged (which explains their financial strength). 
These investment and balance sheet features imply that the net return on SWF tends to 
be higher than on reserves. Indeed, the return on reserves if the sterilization becomes too costly 
(see below) can be negative. 
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4 Sovereign external assets, internal adjustment and global imbalances 
The comparison of reserves and SWFs should be completed by exploring its respective role in 
the persistence of global imbalances. The mechanism is outlined in graph 5, which shows the 
close similarity between both components. The chart also underscores that there are two 
dimensions in the analysis: how SEAs act as a barrier to the internal adjustment and how they 
interact with the global imbalances, which we examine in turn. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
4.1 SEAs as preventing internal adjustment 
If we recall our previous identity, from a balance of payments perspective the accumulation of 
SEAs by a country is simply the counterpart of its current account surplus plus capital inflows. 
However, from an economic viewpoint the existence of current account surplus and 
capital inflows is an expansionary and inflationary shock whose accommodation requires 
an internal economic adjustment ⎯see left part of graph 5. More precisely, the correction of a 
(too wide) current account surplus or a sustained net inflow of capitals requires the 
appreciation of the real exchange rate, which reduces competitiveness and tends to shrink the 
trade balance and moderate domestic activity. From a financial perspective, capital inflows 
increase the demand for domestic currency and therefore tend to appreciate the exchange 
rate. 
The accumulation of SEAs, acts a barrier which prevents this internal adjustment from 
taking place and, thus, tends to prolong the domestic imbalances. 
Let us start with the case of reserve accumulation. The intervention of the Central Bank 
in the forex markets implies the accumulation of reserves counteracts the nominal appreciation 
pressures, maintains domestic competitiveness and shelters the domestic activity (graph 5). 
However, as observed above, if nothing is done these reserves add up to the domestic supply of 
money. If the increase of the money supply surpasses the real demand for money, this imbalance 
 
Net private capital inflows C/A surplus 
Demand (+) 
 
e-r appreciation 
inflation (+) 
Assets 
SWF 
Sterilization 
Reserves 
Financing global 
imbalances 
GRAPH 5: THE ROLE OF SOVEREIGN ASSETS 
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fuels inflationary pressures which are the alternative to engineer a real exchange rate 
appreciation. To counteract them, the increase in reserves is usually sterilised by placing central 
bank or public bonds to banks. In this way, the exchange rate channel remains muted. 
We already saw that reserve accumulation has been working at full steam in the last 
years. Graph 6 displays in a scatterplot the degree of sterilization for the main countries 
accumulating reserves year by year. The solid lines represent the regression for the whole sample 
each year. Points and lines below the 45 degree solid line imply that the increase in money has 
been lower than the increase in reserves, implying a certain degree of sterilization. The slopes of 
the lines have tended to flatten, except for the last years, suggesting an increasingly large 
sterilization in order to offset domestic inflationary pressures. 
The accumulation of reserves in foreign assets (securities) also implies a recycling of 
financial flows to the global financial markets (see the lower right part of the graph 5) and 
therefore financing the external imbalances of countries with current account deficits. This is 
precisely the bottom line of the Bretton Woods II hypothesis [BWII, Dooley et al. (2008)], which 
states that the process of reserve accumulation by Asian countries, and in particular China (some 
Emerging Asian countries have let their exchange rate appreciate substantially in the last years) is 
a sustainable, mutually acceptable compromise, between the export-led growth strategy pursued 
by Asian economies and the need of the US to finance ever wider current account deficits. 
 
Indeed, the large increase in reserves ⎯beyond the precautionary motive as noted⎯ 
and the clear bias towards US securities gives some support to this theory, although there are 
some doubts about its sustainability. 
GRAPH 6: RESERVE ACCUMULATION AND STERILIZATION
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These doubts are justified by the growing costs that accumulating reserves entails, even 
if the accumulation is sterilized. Large scale sterilization (through debt issuance) creates different 
types of problems [see Alberola and Serena (2007) for a detailed account of the costs]. If 
sterilization is carried out with central bank instruments these problems are: crowding out and 
reduction in credit to the private sector, put upward pressure on domestic interest rates, 
generate distortions in the domestic banking systems and can even generate problems domestic 
financial stability, if the portfolios of the domestic financial intermediaries become too biased 
toward sterilization instruments. When sterilization is carried out with government debt, a new 
problem arises, which is the potential conflict between monetary and fiscal policy and the 
eventual dominance of the later on the actions of the central bank. 
Most of these costs are difficult to identify empirically. Mohanty and Turner (2005) point 
out that ⎯up to that year⎯ interventions did not push up domestic interest rates in reserve 
accumulating countries. The empirical analysis in Alberola and Serena (2007) shows that 
accumulation is positively related by the scope of sterilization but that this has not hitherto 
become an effective constraint to reserve accumulation. However, the costs of accumulating 
reserves are there, and growing anecdotal evidence points out they are mounting. For instance, 
in China there has been in the last years a battery of new financial instruments or regulation to 
contain the costs of reserve accumulation and its impact on the domestic financial system, the 
increase in reserve requirements, investment by banks in foreign deposits, etc. Last, and not 
least, the recent move to established a new reserve-linked SWF can be seen as an effort to 
reduce the opportunity costs by increasing its monetary (or social return). As a matter of fact, 
some analysts see this shift from reserves to SWFs as the beginning of a trend which may have 
large implications for global imbalances ⎯see the IMF (2008b), Beck and Fidora (2008). 
The macroeconomic impact of sovereign wealth funds is not that different but, in our 
view, they present some advantages, since many of the costs are missing. 
In this case, the existence of current account surpluses ⎯in commodity SWFs⎯ 
the result of a positive terms of trade (TOT) shock. The improvement of economic perspectives 
associated to the shock can also entail an increase in capital inflows in search of high returns The 
economic impact of and adjustment to this type of shock has been widely analysed [See 
Dornbusch (1980) or more recently Obstfeld and Rogoff (1996)]. The TOT shock generates an 
increase in real domestic income which is translated into an increase in expenditure in domestic 
and external goods. This provokes an increase in demand and inflationary pressures. The 
adjustment requires a real appreciation of the currency ⎯engineered through domestic inflation 
or nominal exchange rate appreciation. This appreciation shifts the demand again towards 
imports and relieves pressures on domestic goods, mitigates overall demand and reduces the 
external surpluses. 
This is the natural adjustment process, but note that it depends on how and to 
what extent the increase in income is effectively translated into the domestic economy. Here is 
where sovereign wealth funds enter the scene. Inasmuch as the financial resources ⎯exports 
revenues accrued to state firms⎯ derived from the terms of trade shocks accrue to SWFs, the 
domestic filtering of their impact is greatly smoothed, mitigated or even short cut. The impact in 
domestic demand and the inflationary and exchange rate pressures are reduced, too6. But note 
                                                                          
6. Many of the Gulf countries sustain hard pegs with the dollar. But note that this is not a direct consequence of the existence 
of sovereign wealth funds; it is an independent monetary policy decision. As a matter of fact, in spite of the pegs the increase 
in reserves in these countries has been limited, implying that the resources accruing to the SWFs act as a substitute to 
reserve accumulation. 
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that this mechanism also prevents the economy from adjusting. As long as commodity prices are 
high (that is, the TOT shock lingers) the economy will be out of its natural long-term equilibrium: 
the exchange rate will remain misaligned and the external surplus will be kept large. Indeed, the 
accumulation of assets can be seen as a way to smooth the adjustment or, even, to delay it until 
the commodity price cycle turns. 
Thus, in practice, the mechanism is analogous than in the case in reserves. But, contrary 
to that case, the accumulation of resources in SWFs does not entail an automatic increase in the 
monetary supply, it does not require sterilization and therefore overcomes domestic monetary 
and financial costs and strains identified in the case of reserves. This lack of costs suggests that  
the domestic constrains to the accumulation of SWFs are much less relevant than in the case of 
reserves and that, as long as the prices of commodity remain high, they are placed in a better 
position relative to reserve accumulation going forward. 
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5 The role of SEAs in covering US external financial needs 
The graph 5 suggests the recycling of international reserves and SWF assets into the global 
markets in the form of capital outflows, feeding the external imbalances of other (developed) 
countries, and so enabling, also in this case, to avoid their adjustment. In this section, we aim at 
providing some rule-of-thumb computations of the role of SEAs (in particular SWFs) in the 
financing of global imbalances, focusing on the US deficit, focusing first in its role to date and 
second on their prospects. 
5.1 US financing needs 
The large US deficit is probably the key element of global imbalances. Indeed, it could be argued 
that the adjustment of the US deficit or net financing needs is well underway (see graph 7). The 
current account deficit peaked in 2006 both in nominal terms in terms of GDP (790 $bn and 6% 
GDP) and the exchange rate has depreciated around 30% in real effective terms since 2002. The 
current account deficit equals the net external financing needs of the US, but another relevant 
figure is the gross financing needs or total capital inflows, since SEAs are capital inflows into the 
US. They represent now close to 2000 $bn dollars and their future evolution is even harder to 
predict. 
As shown in graph 7, the adjustment of the current account would have been much 
larger if the oil prices had not increased to record levels in the first half of 2008. As a rule of the 
thumb a 10$ increase in the barrel of oil worsens the US trade balance by 0.25 percentage 
points of GDP. Thus, the increase in the oil bill contributed 170 $bn to the increase in the current 
account deficit since 2003. Indeed, without the increase in oil prices in the period 2002-2007 the 
current account in 2007 would have been ⎯ceteris paribus⎯ around 4% of GDP. Looking 
ahead, the current account deficit is expected to shrink to less than 600 bn US$, and stabilise 
towards the 3% of GDP, as shown in graph 7. These figures assume high oil prices in the next 
years ⎯100 $/barrel⎯, which implies a petroleum trade deficit ranging between 2.5% and 3% of 
GDP. The non-oil current account deficit becomes lower than 100 $bn in the forecast horizon, 
and less than 0.5 p.p. of GDP7. 
5.2 The coverage of US financing by SEAs to date 
These numbers suggest that, in spite of the adjustment the US imbalance is still large and it is 
expected to remain so. Now we move to assess role of sovereign external assets ⎯first the SWF 
assets then reserves⎯ in its financing, through some simple and approximate back-of-envelope 
calculations. Given the lack of accurate data on sovereign wealth funds holdings, it does not 
come as a surprise that there is no analysis of their role in covering US financing needs. In annex 
1 we explain the methodology used to estimate financial inflows of SWFs into US, which roughly 
consists in estimating the weight of US assets within SWFs investments portfolio, and assuming 
that average holdings match marginal holdings (that any increase in the assets managed by SWF 
will be invested in US assets in the same proportion). We estimate ⎯with a large degree of 
uncertainty⎯ there that around 40% of SWF assets may be invested in US assets. In the last 
year the figure has increased to 42% due to a higher growth of SWFs more prone to invest in the 
US ⎯in particular some oil-related SWFs. Therefore, asset holdings of SWFs in the US would 
have increased from 320 $bn in 2003 to 997 $bn in 2007. As displayed in graph 8, the 
contibution of SWFs to cover US financing needs has become significant, from being irrelevant 
                                                                          
7. The estimation is 107 $/br in 2008, and 100 $/br until 2012. 
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just some years ago: from 5% in 2003 to 13% in 2005, and to 28% in 2007, when purchases 
surpassed the 200 $bn mark. And their relevance ⎯also in qualitative terms⎯ has remarkably 
increased in the last year of turbulence, offering a crucial support to the capitalisation of strained 
financial entities in the U.S. Obviously, this increasing importance has been closely related to the 
high oil and other commodity prices, the basic resource of most SWF. 
Although, as seen above the important role of reserves in financing the US and 
sustaining global imbalances has been object of thorough analysis, the quantitative measurement 
has been scant, probably conditioned by the lack of reliable data.8 National central banks do not 
tend to report the geographical allocation of the international reserves, nor their currency 
breakdown. The COFER database (IMF) provides information on currency composition, but only 
for a limited number of countries ⎯covering only around 62% of total reserves, and around 52% 
of international reserves of emerging economies (less than 3000 $bn dollars at 1Q08), and 
excluding some of the main contributors of the current process of reserve accumulation, such as 
China. Notwithstanding these problems, COFER provides the best available information on 
currency breakdown9. Thus, we use it to provide some back-on-the-envelope calculations on the 
weight of central bank flows on financial inflows into US. 
 
Assets denominated in US$ account for 60% of international reserve holdings, according 
to COFER. It can be argued that the number obtained from COFER that this figures understates 
the fraction of purchases of dollars by central banks in the last years ⎯for instance it is thought 
that the proportion of Chinese reserves in dollar is higher. However, changes in international 
                                                                          
8. See for instance chapter 5 of Dooley, Garber, Folkets-Landau (2008), ECB (2006). Among other analysts, Brad Setser 
tracks in his blog the role of central banks in the financing of the US deficit. 
9. Of the alternative sources of information, the Treasury data on international transactions and holdings (TIC) stands out. 
However, it has important and well known shortcomings. An important one is that it does not track transactions between 
non-residents, so that all transactions in the secondary markets, or done through intermediaries, are not properly compiled; 
moreover the figures of official transactions, used often as proxy of central bank’s purchase and holdings, group together a 
wide set of official institutions (for instance, SWFs), and not only central banks. 
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reserves include both purchases of US assets and valuation effects. Given the trend depreciation 
of the dollar in the last years this implies a reduction of the stock of US$ reserves, relative to 
dollar original purchases. This offset to some extent ⎯but surely not completely⎯ the previous 
bias. In any case, we stick to the COFER figure, in absence of any better non-arbitrary alternative. 
As shown in graph 8, with such number, central banks would have add up more than 
250 bn of assets in US dollars in 2005, 520 bn in 2006, and around 820 bn in 2007. These 
figures are extremely high, even if we take a rather conservative benchmark as seen above. They 
represent more than 40% capital inflows in the US and more than cover the whole net financing 
needs of the US in 2007. 
When we consider the whole SEAs, that is, the sum of reserves and SWF assets, 
we observe that, the coverage ratio of the net financing needs (SEAs US inflows / current 
account) was 135% last year from an average 80% since 2003. The share of reserves has been 
stable around 80% and the SWFs the remaining 20%. 
Therefore, the importance of sovereign external assets has greatly increased in the last 
years, surpassing the trillion dollars in 2007 and thus, representing more than half of the gross 
capital inflows into the US last year. 
These results are quite remarkable, but the quantitative and qualitative importance of 
SEAs could even increase in relative terms, if the fragile financial situation of the US continues 
⎯which implies that other sources of financing are becoming less available⎯ and commodity 
prices recover the high levels of the recent years. 
 
5.3 Perspectives on US financing by Sovereign External assets 
The assessment of the future importance of SWF in US financing requires some projection of the 
evolution of transfers to SWF. For this purpose, it is useful to divide SWFs between oil-related 
SWFs, and other SWFs, given the importance of the former and its close link to oil prices, (graph 
4 C shows the close correlation between the oil prices and transfers to oil-related SWFs). There is 
not concrete information on the determinants of transfers to oil-related SWFs, and on whether 
GRAPH 8: ESTIMATION OF FINANCIAL FLOWS TO US
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they are discretionary or rule-based, so we attempt to fit a regression on their evolution. The 
precise functional form of the regression is inspired by the accepted rationale of the SWFs, 
although by lack of a long time series the projections are necessarilly very rough. The resulting 
increase in (transfers to) oil-related SWF assets is assumed to depend on the current price of oil 
(saving motive) and on the difference between the current oil price and a reference medium-term 
equilibrium price (smoothing motive)10. We take the equilibrium price to be the moving average of 
oil prices the previous 4-years. The fitted curve is plotted as the dark green dashed line in graph 
9, and we see that it closely matches the actual transfers. 
 
 
Looking ahead, rough estimates of the increase in oil-related SWFs can be computed, 
for any forecast of oil prices The fitted regression suggests that a fall (increase) of 10 dollars in oil 
prices reduces (increases) transfers to SWFs in 95 bn US$. Therefore, using the IMF’s October 
2008 medium term forecasts (107 $/br in 2008, stabilizing in 100 $/br afterwards), the increase in 
these SWF would peak in 2008, to dip in the next years before stabilizing in 200 bn US dollars in 
2012, as shown in graph 1011. Since, around 40% of transfers to SWFs are invested into the US, 
this implies that, on impact, the increase of SWFs’ investments in the US (0.4x95 $bn) covers the 
estimated increase in the US trade deficit and financing needs (40 $bn) derived from the higher oil 
prices12. 
 
 
                                                                          
10. The fitted equation is the following: )pricemequilibriuprice_oil(*,price_oil*SWF tttt −+= 000102000∆ . 
11. We are aware that extrapolating the results might yield inexact results, due to issues such as the discretionary 
component in transfers, the possible instability of the transfers’ rule, or possible non-linearities in the link between oil prices 
and transfers. Finally, we estimate transfers to oil-related SWFs in an aggregate way, and given that different countries 
probably have different transfers’ rules (policy reaction functions), changes in oil prices might change the aggregate reaction 
function. 
12. The US imports of oil barrels are around 4.0 billion. Assuming a zero-elasticity of imports to prices, an increase of 10 
dollars in oil prices increases US financing needs in 40 billion US$. 
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However, in the following years –according to our SWF accummulation rule ⎯see 
footnote 11⎯, the increase in SWF progressively diminishes to just 20 $bn. This means that, in 
steady state, the impact of a permanent increase in oil prices only finances half of the additional 
trade deficit in the US. 
Forecasting the evolution of transfers to the rest of SWF is more complex, given the 
different sources and determinants. Hence, we assume that they will grow the average of the last 
four years (the years for which we have reliable information), that is, 54 billion US dollars per year. 
According to our results, SWF assets would increase more than 500 $bn in 2008, and 
they would average close to 250 bn in the remaining years until 2012, so that the stock of SWF 
assets would almost double by the end of 2012 to reach more than 4 trillion dollars at the end of 
2012, of which 3.5 trillion would be managed by oil-related SWF (see graph 10). 
 
We can make a similar exercise with the evolution of reserves, but forecasting their 
evolution is more problematic. As a matter of fact, the growth of reserves has even accelerated in 
the last years, and, again in 2008 they are growing at two-digit rates (1.5 $ trillion increase is the 
forecasted increase by the IMF). Given the recent impact of the turmoil on the pace of reserve 
accumulation by emerging countries, for the period 2009-2012, we take a more conservative 
stance. We simply assume that reserves increase in the next years the average of the period 
2005-2008: 835 billion dollars per year. Note that the persistence of global capital outflows from 
emerging economies and develeraging pose downward risks to this forecast. 
What do these numbers imply for the financing of the US going forward? If the share of 
US investments (40%) is maintained, SWFs would invest 240 $bn in US assets in 2008, covering 
close to 34% of US net financing needs (that is, of the current account deficit). The fraction of US 
financing needs covered by SWF would peak in this year, and afterwards inflows would fall to 160 
bn in 2009, and still amount to 100 bn in 2012. We assume that central banks would invest 60% 
of their new assets in US, so that investments in US would reach 900 $bn in 2008, and 600 $bn 
GRAPH 10: EVOLUTION OF SWF, 2008-2012
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in the next years. All together, inflows from SWFs and central banks (sovereign external assets) 
would reach this year 168% of US financing needs, and their coverage ratio would fall towards 
100% over the forecast horizon. On average in the period 2008-2012 the coverage of the net 
financing needs would be 120% in this benchmark scenario, as seen in graph 11. 
This exercise has assumed that the share of investments in the US remains fixed at the 
current high levels, which is a rather strong assumption. As a matter of fact, some analyst expect 
or predict that sovereign external assets will start moving out of the dollar, due to the doubts on 
the financial and currency strength of the United States. There are two kind of expected shifts: 
first, a lower share of investments in the US by reserve managers and SWFs; second, a move 
from reserves to SWFs, searching for a higher yield along the lines of the Chinese SWF 
mentioned above [see Beck and Fidora (2008)]. 
 
Hence, we assess the impact of this sort of shifts in the coverage of the US financing 
needs, comparing our benchmark with three additional scenarios, which are summed up as 
follows: 
I. Benchmark. 40% of SWFs increase and 60% of the increase in reserves are invested 
in the US. 
II. Scenario 2. The share of US investments reduced by a quarter. Thus 30% of SWFs 
increase and 45% of the increase in reserves are invested in the US. 
*Benchmark scenario: SWFs 40%, CBs 60%; scenario 2: SWFs 30%, CBs 45%; scenario 3: SWFs 40% of the increase in 
their assets and half of the increase of international reserves; CBs 60% of the increase in international reserves; scenario 4: 
SWFs invest 30% of the total growth of SEAs 
GRAPH 11: SOVEREIGN EXTERNAL ASSETS AND US FINANCING NEEDS 
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III. Scenario 3. The benchmark shares are maintained, but we assume that 50% of the 
increase in reserves is moved to SWFs, as the incipient trend of reserve-related SWFs 
would suggest13. 
IV. Scenario 4 is the most extreme, combining a stronger version of the two previous 
scenarios. All the increase in reserves is shifted to SWFs, and they allocate only 30% of 
their assets to the US. 
Under these alternative scenarios, the coverage of the net financing needs is reduced 
relative to the benchmark: 90% in scenario 2, 104% in scenario 3 and falls below total coverage 
(to 66%) in scenario 4. 
All in all, these results suggest that asset accumulation by central banks and SWFs 
generates large financial inflows to the US relative to US net financing needs, even if the 
investment strategies SEAs are notably modified. 
We could thus conclude that the financing of the US current account deficit should not 
be difficult in the years ahead because SEAs provide a thick buffer. This conclusion could be 
jeopardised under a dramatic turnaround of recent trends. Three main factors could trigger such 
reversal: 
a) the end or reversal of SEAs growth, due to a collapse in the price of commodities 
(affecting SWFs) the move to a free float (affecting reserves) or a capital flow reversal (affecting 
probably both). In the first case, it is important to note that, as mentioned above, lower oil prices 
not only reduce SWFs’ resources, but also the US financing needs. 
b) a massive shift of SEAs out of US dollars; 
c) a massive shift of reserve stocks to SWFs assets, which are less prone to invest in US. 
 An alternative reading is that a reduction in the available resources to SWFs 
⎯consequence of lower oil prices⎯ is not worrisome, indeed, to the extent that would be 
associated to a larger reduction of the US financing needs. 
                                                                          
13. Beck and Fidora (2008) consider the extreme scenario in which the whole reserve holdings are moved to SWFs, which 
we consider rather unrealistic. Our exercise (analyzing the impact on capital flows of sovereign saving through SWFs, instead 
than doing it through central banks) is more similar in spirit to that of IMF (2008b). 
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6 Conclusions 
The original motivation of the paper has been to explain the apparent puzzle in a large number of 
emerging market economies: they have large current account surpluses ⎯and therefore, they are 
net creditors to the rest of the world⎯ while they have been flooded by foreign capital inflows in 
the last years. 
The answer to this puzzle is the massive amounts of sovereign external assets (SEAs) 
accumulated by these states: Central Banks’ foreign exchange reserves and transfers to Sovereign 
Wealth Funds (SWFs). We analyze in this paper their role in sustaining global imbalances in the 
recent past and going forward. The following conclusions can be derived from this analysis: 
• SWF and reserves assets play a similar role regarding global imbalances: both help 
to cover the financing needs of deficit countries ⎯in particular in the US⎯ and 
simultaneously, both hinder internal adjustment in current account surplus countries. 
• In quantitative terms the role of SEAs in covering US financial needs has become 
central, according to our back-of-envelope calculations. Assuming that 60% of 
reserves and 40% of SWF assets are invested in the US, SEAs are estimated 
to represent one trillion dollars, that is around half of the gross financial inflows in the 
US, and 130% of the net financial needs. 
• Reserves have been relatively much more important in the recent past: in 2007, the 
stock of reserves was three times larger than SWF holdings; the estimated contribution 
of reserves to covering the US financial needs was four times larger than SWF. 
• However, going forward, SWF are expected to gain relevance, provided that 
commodity prices in the long run regain high levels. In this case, the increase in 
SWFs will remain large, while the future accumulation of reserves is much 
more difficult to predict. Furthermore, the marginal costs of accumulating reserves 
are increasing in monetary, fiscal and financial terms; on the contrary, the perceived 
costs of SWFs accumulation are low or non-existent. Finally, and related to this, 
there is an incipient trend of shifting reserves towards SWFs, which is expected to 
gather speed in the next years. 
• A simple exercise projecting SEAs into the next five years ⎯estimating the growth of 
SWF assets under the expectation of high oil prices and assuming the continuation 
of growth in reserves⎯ suggests that their role in financing will be even more 
relevant going forward, even under a moderate reduction of the share of US assets 
in SEAs investments. 
• Only the end or reversal of SEAs growth, a massive shift of SEAs out of US dollars or the 
massive shift of reserve stocks to SWFs assets, which are less prone to invest in US 
could jeopardise these conclusion. It is difficult to assess the probability of the 
turnaround, although it could be argued that the current financial context may have 
increased it. 
• All in all, the central scenario implies that the continued expansion of SEAs will 
support the global imbalances in the short and medium run. 
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Annex 1: Asset allocation of SWF: share of investments in US 
The importance of SWFs in the financing of the US current account deficit is determined by the 
proportion of assets invested by SWF in the US. In this annex, the approximate weight of US 
assets in SWFs portfolios is assessed, assuming ⎯as a benchmark case⎯ that their marginal 
investment matches their portfolio allocation14. 
 
SWF do not usually provide the currency breakdown of their portfolios, with the 
remarkable exceptions of Norway (where one third of the assets are held in dollars), and Russia 
(where dollar-denominated assets account for 45% of the portfolio). Setser and Ziemba (2008), 
which provide estimations for some SWFs: according to them Kuwait, Qatar and UAE would hold 
about 52% and 40%, and 45% of its total SWF assets in dollars, while about 75% of the assets 
of the Saudi Arabian SWF could be denominated in US dollars15. The total proportion of SWF in 
dollars for these countries ⎯which represent 1800 $bn, 80% of total SWF assets⎯ is 47%. For 
the remaining eleven countries with SWF we assume that they hold the same proportion of the 
assets in US dollars, which is the weighted average of the countries for which there are 
estimations. 
Note that a final step is needed, since it cannot be assumed that currency breakdown 
matches geographical allocation (i.e., that all assets denominated in US dollars are issued in the 
US), especially for fixed income. For non-fixed income assets we assume that currency 
breakdown matches geographical allocation, but for fixed income, we adjust the share of dollar 
assets by the fraction of the global fixed income dollar portfolio invested in US assets, which can 
                                                                          
14. The alternative approach to estimate the investments in US is the use of official US data on foreign holdings of US assets 
(TIC data), but it displays many important and well-known problems (the same that the identification problems of central 
banks’ transactions). Plainly, that they do not track transactions between non-residents, and that group all official 
transactions (SWFs and central banks, among others). Furthermore, the larger share of investments in equity expected by the 
SWF heightens the uncertainty. Indeed, according to TIC data, oil exporting countries would hold over 340 billion dollars, 
which is a very low figure, if oil & energy related SWFs manage close to 2 trillion dollars. 
15. The bulk of the assets of the SWF of Saudi Arabia are managed by the central bank (Saudi Arabia Monetary Authority, 
SAMA) on behalf of the last owner, and their investment strategy of such assets is very similar to that of the international 
reserves of SAMA. 
 
Table 4: Estimated SWFs Investment in US dollars and in the US*
Assets (bn US$) Fraction invested in US$ Fraction invested in the US
Total external assets held by SWFs 2,387 47.0% 40.0%
Of which 0
Transfers in last year, 2007 496 49.4% 42.0%
0
Oil &energy 356 50.3% 42.7%
0
Of which 0
Argelia 17 47.0% 40.0%
Kazahstan 6 47.0% 40.0%
Kuwait 34 52.0% 44.2%
Norway 47 33.0% 28.1%
Russia 99 45.0% 38.3%
Saudi Arabia 74 75.0% 63.8%
Venezuela 8 47.0% 40.0%
Oman 2 47.0% 40.0%
Qatar 18 40.0% 34.0%
UAE 40 45.0% 38.3%
Chile 11 47.0% 40.0%
0
Others 140 47.0% 40.0%
*In bold SWFs for which there is either official information, or estimations in Setser and Ziemba (2008).
Source: Owns estimation (building on national statistics, SWFs reports), IFS (IMF) and Setser and Ziemba (2008)
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be obtained from BIS statistics, and it is 75%. Since fixed income is 60% of the global portfolio, 
this implies that 85% of SWF dollar assets are invested in the US. As a result of these 
computations, 40% of total SWF holdings, and 42% of the increase in 2007 are estimated to be 
invested in US. The difference is due to the higher rate of growth of those SWFs which higher 
propensities to invest in the US. 
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